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CONTINUING THE  
WHITE-COLLAR 
UNIONIZATION MOVEMENT: 
IMAGINING A PRIVATE 
ATTORNEYS’ UNION 
 
Kimberly Y. Chin

 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
“Such equality [between employers and employees] is the central 
need of the economic world today. It is necessary to insure a wise 
distribution of wealth between management and labor, to maintain a full 
flow of purchasing power, and to prevent recurrent depressions.” 
—  Senator Robert Wagner (1934)1 
 
“These law firms are large, wealthy and powerful institutions that 
generally don’t like to talk about how they work. So when you proffer 
information, people get excited. They are peeking behind the curtain. . . . 
We are moving in the direction of greater and greater transparency.” 
— David Lat, Founder of AboveTheLaw.com (2009)2 
 
Beginning in 2008, turmoil rocked the legal industry. In January 
2008, Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft became the first major New York 
law firm to conduct attorney layoffs in anticipation of the economic 
 
    Litigation Associate, Boornazian, Jensen & Garthe; J.D., Boston College Law 
School (2010); B.A., Wellesley College (2005). The Author would like to thank her 
family for their constant support and Professor Thomas Kohler of Boston College Law 
School for his comments, guidance, and advice. A previous version of this Article won 
third place in the 2009-2010 Louis Jackson Memorial National Student Writing 
Competition in Labor and Employment Law. 
1. 78 CONG. REC. 3,443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRB, 
LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 15 (1949). 
2. Rachel M. Zahorsky, David Lat: Gossip at Law, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 23, 2009, 2:03 
AM), http://www.legalrebels.com/posts/david_lat_gossip_at_law/. 
1
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downturn.
3
 Since then, over 5,800 attorneys employed at the nation’s 
top-tiered law firms have been laid off.
4
 Additionally, private law firms, 
in response to this new economic reality, restructured associate 
compensation, reduced or eliminated bonuses, or instituted voluntary 
departure plans or sabbatical programs to encourage associates to leave.
5
 
In 2008 alone, several major law firms collapsed.
6
 
The legal industry’s responses to the difficult economic climate left 
attorneys with low morale, anxiety, frustration, and unhappiness.
7
 The 
majority of associates were troubled by their firm’s lack of transparency 
regarding financial issues and layoffs.
8
 Laid-off associates reported being 
shocked at the news of their firings.
9
 In fact, some associates became 
 
3. Peter Lattman, Cadwalader Laying Off 35 Lawyers, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 
10, 2008, 10:23 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/01/10/cadwalader-laying-off-35-
lawyers/ (explaining that the firm was responding to “market developments with a 
number of initiatives” including “targeted personnel reductions.”).  
4.  Top Ten by Total Layoffs, LAW SHUCKS, http://lawshucks.com/layoff-tracker/ 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2011). The top ten firms in attorney layoffs are, in alphabetical 
order: Allen & Overy, Baker & McKenzie, Clifford Chance, DLA Piper, Eversheds, 
Holland & Knight, Latham & Watkins, Linklaters, Orrick, and White & Case. 
5. See, e.g., Susan Dominus, $80,000 for a Year Off? She’ll Take It!, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2009, at A1 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/13/nyregion/13bigcity.html 
(describing Skadden’s effort to cut costs by offering all associates “the option of 
accepting a third of their base pay to not show up for work for a year.); Elie Mystal, 
Pillsbury: Let’s Try This Whole ‘Voluntary Departure’ Thing One More Time, ABOVE 
LAW (May 18, 2009, 11:21 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/05/pillsbury-lets-try-this-
whole-voluntary-departure-thing-one-more-time/ (stating that Pillsbury has offered two 
voluntary departure programs); Eilene Zimmerman, Chill of Salary Freezes Reaches Top 
Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at BU11 (discussing associate salary freezes and 
the move toward merit-based bonus systems).  
6. See Niraj Chokshi et al., Struggling Heller Calls It Quits, RECORDER (Sept. 26, 
2008),, http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202424812918; Martha Neil, 
Thelen Leaders Seek Vote to Dissolve, Hope to Close By Dec. 1, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 28, 2008, 
3:08 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/thelen_leaders_seek_vote_to_dissolve_hope 
_to_close_by_dec_1/; Debra Cassens Weiss, Thacher Proffitt Announces Expected 
Dissolution, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 22, 2008, 8:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/is_tha 
cher_proffitt_dissolving_before_christmas/. 
7. See Rachel Breitman, A Year to Forget, AMERICANLAWYER.COM. (Aug. 1, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202432587499 (reporting, among 
other things, that 83 percent of respondents to the 2009 American Lawyer annual survey 
of midlevel associates reported medium or high anxiety about losing their jobs). 
8. See id.; Ross Todd, Fading Away, AMERICANLAWYER.COM (Aug. 1, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202432587424 (“In a year filled 
with disappointment, how the bad news was delivered and how departures were 
characterized mattered.”). 
9. David Lat, Will Work for Dinner at Nobu, N.Y. OBSERVER (Jan. 22, 2008, 10:46 
PM), http://www.observer.com/2008/will-work-dinner-nobu (quoting a laid-off 
Cadwalader associate as saying, “I thought I was being called in for my year-end review. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2
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aware of potential layoffs only after noticing that top firm managers and 
human resources directors had reserved the majority of the firm’s 
conference rooms.
10
 Other associates blasted their law firms for failing to 
distinguish between layoffs that were performance-based and those that 
were economically driven, noting that nobody seemed to know what 
factors went into the decision-making process.
11
 
Given the still-rebounding legal market and the secrecy that 
characterized the employment decisions at many of the nation’s top law 
firms during the height of attorney layoffs, this Article imagines the 
formation of private attorney labor unions as a possible solution. Part I 
briefly discusses the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the primary 
piece of legislation that governs employees’ right to organize and 
collectively bargain, focusing primarily on who is covered with 
particular attention placed on the inclusion of professional employees. 
 
. . . I totally wasn’t expecting it.”). 
10. E.g., id. (reporting that associates at Cadwalader became suspicious when the 
firm’s executive director and head of Associate Development and Recruitment reserved 
an entire floor of conference rooms); David Lat & Elie Mystal, Nationwide Layoff Watch: 
Latham & Watkins Is Going for It, ABOVE LAW (Feb. 25, 2009, 10:32 AM), http://abovet 
helaw.com/2009/02/nationwide_layoff_watch_latham_1.php (predicting layoffs at 
Latham & Watkins when associates noticed that conference rooms were reserved for 
Friday, February 27th in the firm’s New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, 
and San Francisco offices). Latham & Watkins later laid off 190 associates and 250 
nonlegal staff, including paralegals, across many of its United States offices on Friday, 
February 27, 2009. David Lat, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Latham Cuts 440 (190 
Associates, 250 Staff), ABOVE LAW (Feb. 27, 2009, 8:17 AM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2009/02/nationwid 
e-layoff-watch-latham-cuts-440190associates-250-staff/; Richard Lloyd, Latham to Cut 
190 Associates, 250 Staff, AM. LAWYWER DAILY (Feb. 27, 2009, 8:24 AM), 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/02/official-latham-to-cut-190associates-
250-staff-.html. 
11. Todd, supra note 8. The article explains: 
 
So what did associates perceive as bad firm conduct? Most were 
skeptical—hostile, even—about cuts that firms labeled as purely 
performance-related. The downturn left most firms with less work 
and lower-than-normal attrition. So to most associates, layoffs were 
understandable. But sending exiting colleagues into a terrible 
economy while tarnished with poor performance reviews drew 
associates’ ire. 
 
Id. In the wake of impending layoffs, one associate, who was later laid off from Pillsbury 
Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP described the firm atmosphere as “tense,” remarking that 
“[p]eople tried to get clarification as to what would be taken into consideration in layoff 
decisions.” Drew Combs, A Different Sort of Lawyer, AMERICANLAWYER.COM (Aug. 1, 
2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202432565393&slreturn=1. 
3
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Part II introduces an understanding of white-collar professionals as a 
distinct economic class, highlighting specifically its similarities and 
differences with traditional blue-collar workers. This Part then uses this 
understanding of white-collar professionals to describe and justify the 
white-collar unionization movement, while also noting the formation of 
unions in other professional industries. Proceeding upon the 
understanding that private law attorneys, as white-collar professionals, 
possess a legitimate interest in organizing, Part III identifies and 
responds to common objections to the formation of attorney labor 
unions. Finally, Part IV suggests that current conditions are ripe for the 
creation of private attorney labor unions and addresses the practical 
considerations associated with forming such unions. 
 
II.  The Legislation Governing the Right to Organize  
and Collectively Bargain 
 
This Part provides a brief overview of the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935 (NLRA or the “Act”). It first situates the Act historically, 
noting its role as part of an overall national policy to ensure economic 
stability and growth. It then explores the evolution of the types of 
employees to which the NLRA applies, specifically focusing on the 
inclusion of professional employees and the extent to which Congress 
contemplated the Act’s application to attorneys. 
 
A.  The National Labor Relations Act of 1935: The Wagner Act 
 
The paramount legislation that governs the rights of employees to 
unionize and collectively bargain is the NLRA, also known as the 
Wagner Act. It encourages “the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining” and protects “the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their 
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of 
their employment.”12 However, the NLRA situated these employees’ 
rights not as an end, but as a means to promote economic stability and 
growth.
13
 
 
12. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 2011). 
13. Senator Wagner, in a speech that was reprinted in the Senate record upon 
introduction of the NLRA, stated: “If we intend to achieve the fundamental reforms of 
the New Deal . . . . Our efforts should be directed, first toward providing the worker with 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2
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Introduced in 1934 during the Great Depression, the NLRA sought 
to prevent the “burdening or obstruct[ion of] commerce” by equalizing 
the organization and bargaining powers between employees and 
employers.
14
 When introducing the bill on the Senate floor, Senator 
Robert Wagner, stated: 
 
This [economic] situation cannot be remedied by new 
codes or by general exhortations. It can be remedied 
only when there is genuine cooperation between 
employers and employees, on a basis of equal bargaining 
power. The only road to this goal is the free and 
unhampered development of real employee 
organizations and their complete recognition. . . . It 
should be guaranteed by enactment of the new 
legislation which is being proposed today.
15
 
 
This sentiment is captured in the introductory section of the NLRA, 
which specifically acknowledges the importance of the equality between 
employees and employers to national economic stability and growth: 
 
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right 
of employees to organize and bargain collectively 
safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or 
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by 
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife 
and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the 
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of 
differences as to wages, hours, or other working 
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining 
power between employers and employees.
16
 
 
Thus, the NLRA should be viewed not only as the legal 
crystallization of the United States’ labor policy, but also the 
 
an income sufficient for comfortable living, and then toward assuring him an equitable 
share in our national wealth.” 78 CONG. REC. 3,678 (1934), supra note 1, at 19 (statement 
of Sen. Wagner). 
14. § 151. See also 78 CONG. REC. 3,443 (1934), supra note 1, at 15 (statement of 
Sen. Wagner). 
15. 78 CONG. REC. 3,443, supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
16. § 151. 
5
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fundamental means by which our government based its economic 
recovery plan and ensured future economic stability and growth.
17
 
In order to accomplish these greater goals, the NLRA provided that 
employees shall have the right to self-organization, collective bargaining, 
and other concerted activities.
18
 But these rights were limited to only 
those the NLRA defined as employees.
19
 The NLRA first limited its 
application to private-sector employees by excluding the United States 
government and any state from the definition of employer.
20
 Second, the 
NLRA defined employee as “any employee” except any “individual 
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any 
family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent 
or spouse.”21 Notably, the NLRA, as originally passed, did not 
 
17. See 78 CONG. REC. 3,443-44 (1934), supra note 1, at 15-17; see generally supra 
note 1 (relating the complete congressional purpose and history behind the NLRA). 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, upon signing the bill in 1935, stated: 
 
By assuring the employees the right of collective bargaining it fosters 
the development of the employment contract on a sound and 
equitable basis. By providing an orderly procedure for determining 
who is entitled to represent the employees, it aims to remove one of 
the chief causes of wasteful economic strife. 
 
79 Cong. Rec. 10,720 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 1, at 3269 (statement of 
Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt). 
18. § 157. In its entirety, the section provides: 
 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from 
any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be 
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor 
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 
158(a)(3) of this title. 
 
Id. 
19. See § 152(3). 
20. See § 152(2) (excluding “the United States . . . or any State or political 
subdivision thereof” from the definition of employer, and thus, their employees from 
coverage under the NLRA). See also Laura Midwood & Amy Vitacco, Note, The Right of 
Attorneys to Unionize, Collectively Bargain, and Strike: Legal and Ethical 
Considerations, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 299, 299 (2000). 
21. § 152(3). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2
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distinguish between professional and non-professional employees.
22
 
 
B.  The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947: The Taft-
Hartley Amendments 
 
In 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act 
(LMRA), also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, which amended portions 
of the NLRA.
23
 One significant amendment was the addition of a 
definition for a professional employee.
24
 Section 2(12) of the NLRA 
provides that a professional employee is 
 
(a) [A]ny employee engaged in work (i) 
predominantly intellectual and varied in character as 
opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or 
physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of 
discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such 
a character that the output produced or the result 
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a 
given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an 
advanced type in a field of science or learning 
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of 
specialized intellectual instruction and study in an 
institution of higher learning or a hospital, as 
distinguished from a general academic education or from 
an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of 
routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or 
(b) [A]ny employee, who (i) has completed the 
courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study 
described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is 
performing related work under the supervision of a 
professional person to qualify himself to become a 
professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
25
 
 
In amending the NLRA to include this definition, Congress 
recognized a distinction between professional and non-professional 
 
22. Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 301. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 302. 
25. § 152(12). 
7
CHIN_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:31 PM 
84 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
employees while also explicitly ensuring that professional employees 
were covered under the Act.
26
 In fact, Congress intended this definition 
to “cover[] such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medical 
personnel together with their junior professional assistants.”27 Moreover, 
the Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare noted: 
 
When Congress passed the National Labor Relations 
Act, it recognized that the community of interests among 
members of a skilled craft might be quite different from 
those of unskilled employees in mass-production 
industry. Although there has been a trend in recent years 
for manufacturing corporations to employ many 
professional persons, including architects, engineers, 
scientists, lawyers, and nurses, no corresponding 
recognition was given by Congress to their special 
problems. Nevertheless such employees have a great 
community of interest in maintaining certain 
professional standards . . . . Under the committee bill, 
the Board is required to afford such groups an 
opportunity to vote in a separate unit to ascertain 
whether or not they wish to have a bargaining 
representative of their own.
28
 
 
Thus, the inclusion of professional employees in the NLRA reflects 
 
26. See id.; 93 CONG. REC. 3,836 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 
NLRB, LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 1009 
(1948). Senator Taft specifically stated, in regards to the application of the NLRA to 
professional employees: 
 
Professional employees are defined to be those who are strictly 
professional, men with highly specialized professional qualifications, 
who may, if they desire, vote themselves out of a plant unit and 
establish a special union for professional employees. Such a union 
would have the protection of the Wagner Act. . . . It would mean that 
the Board could not include professional employees with 
nonprofessional employees if the majority of the professional 
employees in a plant did not desire to be in the general union. 
 
Id. See also Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 301.  
27. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 80-510 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 
1141. 
28. S. REP. NO. 80-105 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 26, at 417. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2
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a recognition that (1) professional employees may have different labor 
interests than non-professional employees, (2) the right of employees to 
organize and collectively bargain extends to professional employees 
despite these different interests, and (3) the exercise of independent 
discretion or judgment in one’s employment is not a per se barrier to 
NLRA coverage.
29
 
At the same time, however, the Taft-Hartley Act amended the 
NRLA’s definition of employee to explicitly exclude supervisors, thus 
denying coverage to any employee found to be a supervisor under the 
statutory definition.
30
 A supervisor is defined as: 
 
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of 
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, 
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other 
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust 
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such 
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise 
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical 
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
31
 
 
In justifying this amendment, Congress expressed concern about the 
conflict of interest that would arise if a supervisor, who typically works 
to further the interest of his or her employer, was expected to act with a 
union against that employer’s interest.32 Accordingly, while the Taft-
Hartley Amendments ensured that the NLRA explicitly covered 
 
29. See id.; 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(12). 
30. § 152(3) (explaining that the term “employee” would not encompass “any 
individual employed as a supervisor.”). 
31. § 152(11). 
32. 93 CONG. REC. A2,010 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 26, at 868-69 
(statement of Rep. Meade). More specifically, Congressman Meade remarked: 
 
By definition, the new Board would be prohibited from setting 
up a union to represent supervisory employees. 
This section of the bill is an example of the old adage, “One 
cannot serve two masters.” It would be an utterly impossible position 
in which to place a man—he would be paid by his employer but he 
[is] expected to go along with the union of which he was a member. I 
am convinced the committee acted wisely in prohibiting unionization 
of foremen or supervisors. 
 
Id. 
9
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professional employees, they also limited coverage by excluding 
supervisors. 
33
 In effect, these particular amendments create a tension 
between professional employees, who are statutorily allowed to organize, 
and supervisors, who are often professional employees, but are barred by 
statute from unionizing. This tension will be discussed further in Part III, 
infra. 
 
III.  The White-Collar Professional and 
the White-Collar Unionization Movement 
 
“[The white-collar man] is more often pitiful than 
tragic, as he is seen collectively, fighting impersonal 
inflation, living out in slow misery his yearning for the 
quick American climb. He is pushed by forces beyond his 
control, pulled into movements he does not understand; 
he gets into situations in which his is the most helpless 
position. The white-collar man is the hero as victim, the 
small creature who is acted upon but who does not act, 
who works along unnoticed in somebody’s office or 
store, never talking loud, never talking back, never 
taking a stand.” 
— C. Wright Mills, Sociologist (1951)34 
 
Given that Congress explicitly allows professional employees to 
organize and collectively bargain, this Part explores why such activities 
would be appealing to white-collar professionals. It begins with an 
exploration into the white-collar worker, specifically the white-collar 
professional, as a distinct economic class. It identifies three 
characteristics that serve to highlight the similarities and differences 
between this class of workers and blue-collar workers. Lastly, it 
introduces the white-collar unionization movement, drawing upon the 
characteristics of the white-collar professional to describe its initial 
impetus and argue for its continuation. It will also touch briefly on the 
history of white-collar unionization in the United States and identify 
existing white-collar unions. 
 
 
33. § 152(11)-(12). 
34. C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS, at xii 
(1956). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2
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A.  The White-Collar Professional 
 
On a definitional level, the white-collar occupation group is broken 
into four main sections: (1) professional, technical, and kindred workers; 
(2) managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm; (3) clerical and 
kindred workers; and (4) sales workers.
35
 For purposes of this Article, 
one should note that the category of professional white-collar workers 
consists of “lawyers, engineers, doctors, and teachers” as well as 
“technicians . . . airline pilots, professional nurses (but not practical 
nurses), and those employed as entertainers.”36 Common among these 
professionals is the requirement of “specialized, systematic, and often 
lengthy training.”37 As of 2006, there were almost thirty million white-
collar professions in the United States, with a projection that the number 
would reach nearly thirty-five million by 2016, almost 21 percent of the 
labor force.
38
 
On a broader level, however, white-collar workers are a distinct 
category of laborers that came to symbolize twentieth-century 
existence.
39
 C. Wright Mills, a sociologist, conducted the most extensive 
study of white-collar workers, and noted that “they are a new cast of 
actors, performing the major routines of twentieth-century society.”40 
Specifically, white-collar professionals are distinguishable from blue-
collar workers in their education and occupational duties, but are also 
remarkably similar to them because of an increased dependence on 
employers as more and more white-collar professionals move into 
salaried positions.
41
 The resulting quasi-independent nature of the white-
collar professional’s work led to the identification of three seemingly 
contradictory characteristics inherent to this new class of workers: (1) 
increased employment dependence despite being highly skilled; (2) 
 
35. Everett M. Kassalow, White-Collar Unionism in the United States, in WHITE-
COLLAR TRADE UNIONS: CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES 
305, 311 (Adolf Sturmthal ed., 1966). 
36. Id. at 312. 
37. MILLS, supra note 34, at 112. 
38. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL 
PROJECTIONS AND TRAINING DATA 45 (2008-09 ed.), available at http://www.bls.gov/emp 
/optd/optd_archive.htm (download document in .pdf format and proceed to Table III-1 on 
page 45).  
39. MILLS, supra note 34, at ix (“[I]t is to this white-collar world that one must look 
for much that is characteristic of twentieth-century existence.”). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 112. 
11
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continued identification with management; and (3) a strong belief in 
individual advancement. It is these three characteristics that led scholars 
to speculate about the growth in white-collar unionization. 
 
1. New Dependence 
 
Because white-collar professionals, particularly doctors and 
lawyers, have shifted toward salaried positions, these once independent 
professionals are now increasingly dependent on their employers.
42
 Mills 
observed: 
 
Most professionals are now salaried employees . . . 
and fitted into the new hierarchical organizations of 
educated skill and service; intensive and narrow 
specialization has replaced self-cultivation and wide 
knowledge; assistants and sub-professionals perform 
routine, although often intricate, tasks, while successful 
professional men become more and more the managerial 
type. So decisive have such shifts been, in some areas, 
that it is as if rationality itself had been expropriated 
from the individual and been located, as a new form of 
brain power, in the ingenious bureaucracy itself.
43
 
 
In other words, while old professionals used to “hang a shingle,” the 
new white-collar professional sacrificed this independence to become 
part of what Mills terms the “managerial demiurge”—“attached to 
institutions” but never fully becoming “autonomous professionals 
themselves.”44 This shift culminated in a new dependency in the 
 
42. See id., at x (“In the established professions, the doctor, lawyer, engineer, once 
was free and named on his own shingle; in the new white-collar world, the salaried 
specialists of the clinic, the junior partners in the law factory, the captive engineers of the 
corporation have begun to challenge free professional leadership.”). 
43. Id. at 112. 
44. Id. at 114. Mills observed: 
 
Most of the old professionals have long been free practitioners; 
most of the new ones have from their beginnings been salaried 
employees. But the old professions, such as medicine and law, have 
also been invaded by the managerial demiurge and surrounded by 
sub-professionals and assistants. The other practitioner’s office is 
thus supplanted by the medical clinic and the law factory, while 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2
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workplace, resulting in professionals who no longer determined their 
own work or practice.
45
 As a result, these white-collar professionals 
occupy a hybrid position that maintains some of the entrepreneurship of 
the old professional yet is subjected to the bureaucracy and dependency 
that normally characterizes blue-collar workers.
46
 
When this hybrid situation is applied to lawyers, Mills paints a 
painfully accurate portrayal of contemporary associate life. He first sets 
up a dichotomy in which he compares the lawyers of the nineteenth-
century, who were “agent[s] of the law, handling the general interests of 
society,” with those of the twentieth-century, for whom “the public has 
become . . . an object of profit rather than of obligation.”47 This shift in 
focus has thus led to a fundamental change in the practice of law, giving 
rise to large law firms, which transforms the lawyer from “a consultant 
and counselor to large business” to “its servant, its champion, its ready 
apologist.”48 Consequently, the modern corporation has led the lawyer to 
 
newer professions and skills, such as engineering and advertising, are 
directly involved in the new social organizations of salaried brain 
power. 
 
Id. at 113. Particularly, Mills noted that “[l]aw partners give their less challenging tasks 
to clerks and salaried associates,” concluding that “[i]n practically every profession, the 
managerial demiurge works to build ingenious bureaucracies of intellectual skills.” Id. at 
115. 
45. Id. at 114-15. Mills writes: 
 
[P]rofessional men and women have become dependent upon the new 
technical machinery and upon the great institutions within whose 
routines the machines are located. They work in some department, 
under some kind of manager; while their salaries are often high, they 
are salaries, and the conditions of their work are laid down by rule. 
What they work on is determined by others, even as they determine 
how a host of sub-professionals assistants will work. Thus they 
themselves become part of the managerial demiurge. 
 
Id. at 114. 
46. See id. at 115. 
47. See id. at 121-22. 
48. See id. at 122-23. Mills also observed: 
 
The function of the law has been to shape the legal framework for the 
new economy of the big corporation, with the split ownership and 
control and the increased monopoly of economic power. 
. . . . 
In fulfilling his function the successful lawyer has created his 
office in the image of the corporations he has come to serve and 
13
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erect a legal framework for the managerial demiurge.
49
 
The result is essentially a “law factor[y],” where partners oversee 
salaried associates, ensuring that “production lines and organization run 
smoothly.”50 In turn, associates “work for only one important client or on 
one type of problem” and “like a mechanic in a big auto repair shop, 
[each salaried lawyer] is required to account for his time, in order that 
fees may be assigned to given cases and the practice kept moving.”51 
This change in the practice of law and working conditions situates these 
white-collar professionals closer to their blue-collar brethren than the old 
independent professionals.
52
 
 
2. Identification with Management 
 
Despite the white-collar professionals’ new dependence on their 
employer for work, they surprisingly maintain a close identification with 
management.
53
 This may be because of the similarities between the 
white-collar professional and his employer in terms of work and 
education.
54
 Mills observed: 
 
 
defend. Because of the increased load of the law business and the 
concentration of successful practice, the law office has grown in size 
beyond anything dreamed of by the nineteenth-century solicitor. Such 
centralization of legal talent, in order that it may bear more closely 
upon the central functions of the law, means that many individual 
practitioners are kept on the fringes, while others become salaried 
agents of those who are at the top. As the new business system 
becomes specialized, with distinct sections and particular legal 
problems of its own, so do lawyers become experts in distinct 
sections and particular problems, pushing the interests of these 
sections rather than standing outside the business system and serving 
a law which co-ordinates the parts of a society. 
 
Id. at 122. 
49. Id. at 123. 
50. See id. at 123-24. 
51. Id. at 124. 
52. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 356 (“Under these conditions the special 
individual characteristics of white-collar work tend to disappear and more of it becomes 
routinized and bureaucratized.”); MILLS, supra note 34, at 301 (“Whatever their 
aspirations, white-collar people have been pushed by twentieth-century facts toward the 
wage-worker kind of organized economic life.”). 
53. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 356; MILLS, supra note 34, at 305. 
54. See MILLS, supra note 34, at 305. 
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[T]he technological and educational similarity of white-
collar work to the work of the boss; the physical 
nearness to him; the prestige borrowed from him; the 
rejection of wage-worker types of organization for 
prestige reasons; the greater privileges and securities; the 
hope of ascent—all these, when they exist, predispose 
the white-collar employee to identify with the boss.
55
 
 
In other words, the white-collar professional believes that the shared 
similarities translate into shared interests.
56
 This belief, however, may 
not be well-placed: 
 
White-collar people may be part of management, like 
they say, but management is a lot of things, not all of 
them managing. You carry authority, but you are not its 
source. . . . [Y]ou are a link in the chains of commands . 
. . which bind together the men who make decisions and 
the men who make things; without you the managerial 
demiurge could not be. . . . You are closer to 
management than the wage-workers are, but yours is 
seldom the last decision.
57
 
 
Despite the contemporary working conditions that characterize 
white-collar occupations, there remains a loyalty to management.
58
 
 
3. Belief in Personal Advancement 
 
Lastly, the white-collar professional retains a strong belief in 
personal advancement partly because of his identification with 
management. Due to the nature of a white-collar professional’s work and 
higher education, the white-collar professional, unlike the blue-collar 
worker, possesses aspirations that “often take the form of a desire of 
 
55. Id. 
56. See id. 
57. Id. at 80. 
58. See id. at 305. Mills also observed that there may be “fear and even hatred of the 
boss,” and that this “loyalty to management” could simply be an “insecure cover-up for 
fear of reprisal.” Id. 
15
CHIN_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:31 PM 
92 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
‘getting ahead’” as opposed to “getting by.”59 As a result, the white-
collar professional focuses on “upward orientation” and “fair channels of 
promotion” rather than relying on organizing.60 
In sum, these three characteristics demonstrate the complexity of the 
white-collar professional and the inherent tensions that exist when 
considering whether to unionize. On the one hand, white-collar 
professionals are no longer independent workers—they increasingly rely 
on employers for their work, leaving them in less control of their 
working conditions, much like blue-collar workers. Thus, unionization is 
the obvious solution to gain back control. On the other hand, the 
similarities white-collar professionals share with their employers, 
including education, responsibilities, and duties, create a sense of shared 
interests, whether or not this is true. This sense coupled with the white-
collar professional’s belief in advancement—that is, his desire and belief 
that, one day, he too could become the employer—decreases the 
likelihood of unionization since the creation of a union would place him 
directly adverse to his employer, thus impeding his ability to advance. 
Despite this tension, however, there have been many successful attempts 
to unionize white-collar professionals. 
 
B.  The White-Collar Unionization Movement 
 
In 1957, the number of white-collar workers in the United States 
surpassed that of blue-collar workers.
61
 This marked a genuine shift in 
the labor market, and as the number of white-collar workers continued to 
grow rapidly, many scholars in the following decades were left to 
speculate about these new workers and their impact on the national labor 
movement.
62
 As a result, many hypothesized that the increase in the 
 
59. Kassalow, supra note 35, at 359 (“[T]he manual worker is more often likely to 
be content with ‘getting by.’”). 
60. See id. at 359-60. 
61. Id. at 306; Kassalow also noted that the “United States is the first country in the 
world in which manual or blue-collar workers have ceased to be the largest single 
occupational groups of the labor force. They have been displaced . . . by white-collar 
workers.” Id. at 305. See also MARK MCCOLLOCH, WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN 
TRANSITION 3 (1983) (“By the late 1950’s, [white-collar workers] outnumbered 
production workers for the first time.”).  
62. MCCOLLOCH, supra note 61, at 3. Kassalow, in particular, noted in another 
piece that the increase in white collar workers arguably corresponded with the decline in 
union membership. Everett M. Kassalow, Unionization of White-Collar Workers, in 
LABOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 158, 159 (William Haber ed., 1966). 
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number of white-collar workers, the nature of the workers themselves, 
and other social, economic, and technological shifts would eventually 
lead to greater white-collar unionization.
63
 
Although the call for greater white-collar unionization peaked in the 
1970s, this did not mark the beginning of white-collar unions.
64
 In fact, 
white-collar unions date back to the late nineteenth-century and the early 
twentieth-century with the railroad, the government, and the 
entertainment industry being the historical centers.
65
 In addition, during 
the 1940s and 1960s, several professional associations transformed into 
collective bargaining agents for their members.
66
 Today, there are 
numerous unions for white-collar professionals, including but not limited 
to doctors, nurses, musicians, actors, accountants, writers, and teachers.
67
 
The impetus for the white-collar unionization movement arose from 
several factors. First, the increase in the number of white-collar workers 
contributed greatly to the movement. With the decline of blue-collar 
workers, who traditionally formed the base of the labor movement, the 
growing number of white-collar workers placed pressure on the labor 
movement to adapt in order to survive.
68
 In addition, the labor history of 
the United States, with its dependence on group bargaining, suggested 
that an economic group as large as white-collar workers would 
eventually seek its own channels of representation and influence.
69
 
 
63. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 305; MILLS, supra note 34, at 301-02. 
64. See MCCOLLOCH, supra note 61, at 3; MILLS, supra note 34, at 302-03. For a 
general discussion of the beginnings of white-collar unionism and identification of early 
white-collar unions, please see Kassalow, supra note 35, at 318-29. 
65. See Kassalow, supra note 62, at 163 (“[S]ignificant union organization among 
postal employees, railway clerks, retail clerks and a few other white-collar groups goes 
back many decades. Musicians, actors, artists, airline pilots, and journalists have also 
been well unionized for years.”); Kassalow, supra note 35, at 318 (“Notable among the 
early white-collar organizations at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth 
century were those of the government postal employees, the retail clerks, and the railway 
clerks.”). See also MILLS, supra note 34, at 303. 
66. Kassalow, supra note 35, at 351-53 (describing how the American Nurses 
Association and the National Education Associations for years opposed unionization and 
collective bargaining, but later modified themselves to become collective bargaining 
agents). 
67. For a better idea of the number and types of unions in existence, see Unions of 
the AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/unions/ (last visited Oct. 22, 
2011) (a complete list of all unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO). 
68. See Kassalow, supra note 62, at 159 (“The American labor movement, much 
like labor movements in other industrial nations, has always based itself primarily on 
manual workers, and it is now confronted with the fact that its base is eroding.”). 
69. See id. at 162-63. More specifically, Kassalow opined: 
 
17
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Second, the working conditions of white-collar workers may create an 
incentive to unionize.
70
 As described earlier, the current conditions of the 
white-collar workers’ employment have changed drastically from those 
of old professionals so that they now closely mirror those of the blue-
collar worker.
71
 The resulting bureaucracy and dependency leads to “a 
specific kind of job dissatisfaction—the feeling that as an individual he 
cannot get ahead in his work.”72 This ultimately creates “the job factor 
that predisposes the white-collar employee to go pro-union.”73 Lastly, the 
fact that white-collar workers are not immune from layoffs or salary cuts 
gives further incentive to unionization.
74
 For instance, during the Great 
Depression, white-collar workers faced unemployment just like blue-
collar workers. A description of the circumstances faced then by white-
collar workers is astoundingly similar to those faced now by current 
private law attorneys: 
 
 
I am quite convinced that one way or another these “new 
millions” in American economic life will demand and establish their 
own channels of representation and influence. In a society which is 
increasingly characterized by group bargaining and by group 
consultation on the part of government, no major economic group 
will long be without its organization form and channel. 
 
Id. 
70. See MILLS, supra note 34, at 304-05. Mills observed: 
 
Objective circumstances of the work situation influence the 
white-collar employees’ psychology when they are confronted with 
the idea of joining a union. By and large, these are not different from 
those affecting the organizability of wage-workers, and include: 
strategic position in the technological or marketing processes of an 
industry, which conditions bargaining power; unfair treatment by 
employers, which creates a high state of grievance; a helpful legal 
framework, which protects the right to organize; a profitable business 
but one in which labor costs form a small proportion of the cost of 
production, which means that higher wages will not severely affect 
total costs; relative permanency of employment and of labor force, so 
that organization may be stable. 
 
Id. 
71. See supra Part III.A.1. 
72. MILLS, supra note 34, at 307. 
73. Id. 
74. See JÜRGEN KOCKA, WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN AMERICA 1890-1940: A 
SOCIAL-POLITICAL HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 218 (Maura Kealey, trans. 
1980). 
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During the depression unemployment was a 
common occurrence for white-collar workers in industry 
as well as in commerce, though they were not as hard hit 
as industrial blue-collar workers. Even if they kept their 
jobs, however, the hours of office of technical 
employees were often reduced when business was slow; 
their wages were docked accordingly. Many firms also 
attempted to cut down their office costs by more closely 
supervising white collar workers, which further reduced 
the small privileges and freedoms that separated the 
office from the factory floor. . . . White collar employees 
were also adversely affected by cutbacks in company 
welfare policies: stock and profit sharing plans, 
subsidized housing, savings banks, cafeterias and paid 
vacations were often eliminated, and there were fewer 
recreational and educational offerings.
75
 
 
This uncertainty provides further motivation for white-collar 
workers to act collectively to create more stable working conditions.
76
 
 
IV.  Objections to Private Attorneys Organizing and Responses 
 
Given the growing similarities between the working conditions of 
the white-collar professional and the traditional blue-collar worker, it is 
not difficult to imagine a continuation of the white-collar unionization 
movement. In particular, the impact of the economic downturn on 
“Biglaw” may lead many associates to consider unionizing.77 
Generally speaking, private attorneys maintain the same legal rights 
to organize and collectively bargain as other employees.
78
 In fact, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the “Board”) has, since 1977, 
asserted jurisdiction over law firms with gross revenue of five hundred 
 
75. Id. at 218-19. 
76. See Kassalow, supra note 62, 162-63; KOCKA, supra note 74, at 219. 
77. In fact, the impetus for this Article was a conversation the Author had with a 
junior associate at a prominent San Francisco law firm. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Attorney 
Labor Unions, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 2007, at 23 n.1 (“There is no reason to believe that 
attorneys would be less interested in joining unions than the American workforce in 
general.”). 
78. See Rubinstein, supra note 77. 
19
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thousand dollars.
79
 Since employees in law firms, including attorneys, 
are subject to the NLRA, discussed supra, employers of private attorneys 
may argue that attorneys are excluded from organizing because they are 
confidential employees, supervisory employees, or managerial 
employees. They may also argue that attorneys cannot unionize because 
legal ethics will hinder collective bargaining efforts. This Part will 
address each of these objections. 
 
A.  The Confidential Employee Exclusion 
 
The Board has excluded from the definition of employee 
“confidential employees.”80 The Supreme Court has identified two 
categories of confidential employees that are excluded from the NLRA’s 
protection: (1) employees that “assist and act in a confidential capacity to 
persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies 
in the field of labor relations,” and (2) employees who “regularly have 
access to confidential information concerning anticipated changes which 
may result from collective-bargaining negotiations.”81 In other words, 
here, the term confidential employees does not refer to the nature of the 
employee’s work—that is, the confidential nature of an attorney’s work; 
rather, it refers to those who are “involved in internal confidential labor 
relations matters with respect to their employer.”82 Thus, in order to be 
considered a confidential employee, the employee must “in the regular 
course of [her] duties, have access to confidential data bearing directly 
upon the employees’ labor relations.”83 
The rationale for this exclusion is that management should not be 
required to handle labor relations matters through an employee who is 
represented by the union because of the risk that the employee will have 
advance access to the company’s position regarding negotiations and 
 
79. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977). 
80. E.g., NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 
(1981); Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n., 277 N.L.R.B. 1 (1985); Ford Motor Co., 66 
N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946). 
81. NLRB v. Meenan Oil Co., 139 F. 3d 311, 317 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec., 454 U.S. at 189). 
82. Id. (“[E]mployees who have access to confidential business information are not 
for that reason excludible from collective-bargaining units.”). See also Rubinstein, supra 
note 77, at 23. 
83. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. at 1322; see also Meenan Oil Co., 139 F. 3d at 
317 (“For this purpose, a confidential employee is one who has access to confidential 
information that is labor-related.”). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2
CHIN_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:31 PM 
2012] IMAGINING A PRIVATE ATTORNEYS’ UNION 97 
other matters.
84
 However, mere access to confidential information 
regarding labor relations is insufficient to confer confidential status upon 
an employee.
85
 As a result, the Board developed the “labor nexus” test, 
which the Supreme Court approved in NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural 
Elec. Membership Corp., to determine which employees are 
confidential.
86
 The test asks whether the employee “assist[s] and act[s] in 
a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and 
effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.”87 In this 
way, the test focuses not on the access an employee has to confidential 
labor management information, but on whether the employee works in a 
confidential capacity with a person “who exercise[s] managerial 
authority in labor relations.”88 As the Board stated: 
 
Under [the labor nexus test] it is insufficient that an 
employee may on occasion have access to certain labor 
related or personnel type information. What is 
contemplated instead is that a confidential employee is 
involved in a close working relationship with an 
individual who decides and effectuates management 
labor policy and is entrusted with decisions and 
information regarding this policy before it is made 
 
84. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec., 454 U.S. at 179 (quoting Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 
1321, 1323 (1944)). In full, the Supreme Court recognized: 
 
Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters 
through employees who are represented by the union with which the 
[c]ompany is required to deal and who in the normal performance of 
their duties may obtain advance information of the [c]ompany’s 
position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of 
grievances, and other labor relations matters. 
 
Id. (alteration in original). See also Meenan Oil Co., 139 F. 3d at 318 (“An individual 
who routinely sees data which would enable the union to predict, understand or evaluate 
the bargaining position of the employer is therefore excluded from union membership.”). 
85. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec., 454 U.S at 189 (“[T]he Board has never followed 
a practice of depriving all employees who have access to confidential business 
information from the full panoply of rights afforded by the Act.”). 
86. See id at 190-91. 
87. Id. at 173 (quoting Hendricks Cnty. Rural Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 
(1978)). 
88. Rubinstein, supra note 77, at 24 (citing Ford. Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 
1322 (1946)). 
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known to those affected by it.
89
 
 
The determination of whether an employee is a confidential 
employee is often the subject of litigation and will necessarily be fact-
specific.
90
 In general, however, most attorneys in private law firms are 
not involved with the labor management of the firms for which they 
work and thus will not meet the labor nexus test.
91
 Consequently, most 
private attorneys will not be prevented from organizing based upon the 
exclusion of confidential employees. 
 
B.  The Supervisory Employee Exclusion 
 
The greatest obstacle to private attorney unionization is probably 
the statutory exclusion of supervisors, discussed supra. Given that even 
the lowliest junior associate in a private law firm is entrusted with 
supervising secretaries, paralegals, and other support staff, associates 
may be considered “supervisors” under the NLRA, thus excluding them 
from unionizing efforts. 
The rationale for excluding supervisors from organizing rests with 
Congress’s primary intent “to protect ‘laborers’ and ‘workers’ whose 
right to organize and bargain collectively had not been recognized by 
industry,” whereas “there was no similar history with respect to foremen, 
managers, superintendents, or vice presidents.”92 Congress further noted 
that attempts to unionize supervisors “hurt productivity, increased the 
accident rate, upset the balance of power in collective bargaining, and 
tended to blur the line between management and labor.”93 Congress also 
found that “unionization of supervisors had deprived employers of the 
 
89. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 277 N.L.R.B. 1, 4 (1985), aff’d, Intermountain 
Rural Elec. Ass’n v. NLRB, 1988 WL 166520 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1046 (1989). 
90. NLRB v. Meenan Oil Co., 139 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Status as a 
confidential employee is a question of fact.”). 
91. For example, most associate attorneys will not have access to projected wage 
and salary data or be involved in the preparation of the law firm’s profit plan. See 
Meenan Oil Co., 139 F.3d at 318-19 (holding that employees who helped prepare the 
company’s profit plan and had access to projected wage and salary information were 
confidential employees and could not be included in the collective-bargaining unit). 
92. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 279 (1974) (citing Packard Motor 
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1947)). 
93. Id. at 281 (citing S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 4 (1947)). 
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loyal representations to which they were entitled.”94 In sum, Congress 
was “concerned . . . with the welfare of ‘workers’ and ‘wage earners,’ 
not of the boss.”95 
The burden of proving supervisory status falls on the party claiming 
that the employee is a supervisor, which is usually the employer.
96
 
However, not every “order giver” is a supervisor.97 The NLRA defines 
supervisor as: 
 
[A]ny individual having the authority, in the interest of 
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, 
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other 
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust 
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such 
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise 
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical 
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
98
 
 
Consequently, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Health Care & 
Retirement Corp., described the test for determining whether an 
employee is a supervisor as follows: 
 
[T]he statute requires the resolution of three questions; 
and each must be answered in the affirmative if an 
employee is to be deemed a supervisor. First, does the 
employee have authority to engage in 1 of the 12 listed 
activities? Second, does the exercise of that authority 
require “the use of independent judgment”? Third, does 
the employee hold the authority “in the interest of the 
employer?”99 
 
94. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 16-17 (1947)). 
95. Id. at 282. 
96. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 710-12 (2001). 
97. See King Broad. Co., 329 N.L.R.B. 378, 383 n.34 (1999) (citing NLRB v. Sec. 
Guard Servs. 384 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1967)). The King Broadcasting Co. decision 
also noted that “it is well established that merely having the authority to assign work does 
not establish statutory supervisory authority. Further, not every act of assignment 
constitutes statutory supervisory authority.” Id. at 383 (citing Providence Hosp., 320 
N.L.R.B. 717, 727 (1996)). See also Rubinstein, supra note 77, at 24 (citing NLRB v. 
Sec. Guard Servs., 384 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1967)). 
98. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(11) (West 2011). 
99. 511 U.S. 571, 573-74 (1994) (quoting Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 
23
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Importantly, an employee need only engage in one of the twelve 
listed activities in order to achieve supervisory status.
100
 However, any of 
these actions must be done with “independent judgment” in order to 
satisfy the test.
101
 
In the case of attorneys seeking to organize, distinguishing 
“independent judgment” from “professional judgment” is particularly 
difficult.
102
 The Supreme Court addressed this difficulty when deciding 
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.
103
 There, the Supreme 
Court was asked to consider whether the exercise of “ordinary 
professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees” 
constituted the use of “independent judgment” for the purposes of 
satisfying the test for supervisory status.
104
 Rejecting the “categorical 
exclusion” of professional judgment from the understanding of 
“independent judgment,” the Court found that “a supervisor’s judgment 
[did not cease] to be ‘independent judgment’ because it depended upon 
the supervisor’s professional or technical training or experience.”105 Yet, 
the Court maintained that “[m]any nominally supervisory functions may 
be performed without the ‘exercis[e of] such a degree of . . . judgment or 
discretion . . . as would warrant a finding’ of supervisory status under the 
Act,” noting that “the degree of judgment that might ordinarily be 
required to conduct a particular task may be reduced below the statutory 
threshold by detailed orders and regulations issued by the employer.”106 
 
491, 493 (1993)). 
100. E.g., Fred Meyer Alaska, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 646, 649 (2001) (“To meet this 
definition, a person needs to possess only one of the specific criteria listed.”); King 
Broad. Co., 329 N.L.R.B. at 381 (quoting Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385, 387 
(6th Cir. 1949)) (“Section 2(11) is to be read in the disjunctive, and the ‘possession of 
any one of the authorities listed in [that section] places the employee invested with this 
authority in the supervisory class.’”) (alteration in original). 
101. See King Broad. Co., 329 N.L.R.B. at 381 (“As with every supervisory indicia, 
assignment must be done with independent judgment before it is considered to be 
supervisory under Section 2(11).”). 
102. See id. at 383 (citing Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 730 (1996) (“We 
recognize that it is often difficult to separate the exercise of judgment necessary to the 
performance of an individual’s own job from the supervisory independent judgment of 
Section 2(11) of the Act, particularly where skilled employees are directing other skilled 
employees, or professional employees are direction nonprofessional employees.”). 
103. 532 U.S. 706 (2001). 
104. See id at 713 (quoting Pet’r’s Br. at 11). 
105. Id. at 714-15. 
106. Id. at 713-14 (quoting Weyerhauser Timber Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1170, 1173 
(1949)). See also King Broad. Co., 329 N.L.R.B. at 383 (Noting that “the authority of an 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2
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How this affects the bargaining status of law firm associates remains 
terribly unclear, but it suggests that if an associate’s directions to support 
staff fall within the orders of a partner, the associate may not rise to the 
level of statutory supervisory status.
107
 
In 2006, the Board, in Oakwood Healthcare Inc., considered 
whether charge nurses were supervisors under the NLRA.
108
 In deciding 
the case, the Board attempted to clarify the terms “assign,” “responsibly 
to direct,” and “independent judgment” as used in the statutory definition 
of supervisor.
109
 These definitional clarifications are particularly 
important to attorneys who desire to organize because their employers 
will probably assert that they assign or responsibly direct others with 
independent judgment in order to exclude them from any bargaining unit. 
Regarding the term “assign,” the Board explained that it 
 
[R]efer[red] to the act of designating an employee to a 
place (such as a location, department, or wing), 
appointing an employee to a time (such as a shift or 
overtime period), or giving significant overall duties, 
i.e., tasks, to an employee. That is, the place, time, and 
work of an employee are part of his/her terms and 
conditions of employment.
110
 
 
The Board went further to distinguish the “designation of significant 
overall duties” from “ad hoc instructions that the employee perform a 
discrete task,” stating that the NLRA’s use of “assign” referred to the 
former rather than the latter.
111
 
 
individual employee to direct another to perform discrete tasks stemming from the 
directing employee’s experience, skills, training, or position is not supervisory authority. 
In these circumstances, such directions simply are incidental to the employee’s ability to 
perform their own work.”). 
107. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. at 713-14. See also King Broad. Co., 329 
N.L.R.B. at 383. In King Broadcasting Co., the Board found that news producers were 
not supervisors because “the relationship of the producers to other news department 
employees is not supervisory, but rather, is one of coworkers involved in separate but 
sequential functions in the development of a single product.” Id. at 383. It could be 
argued that the relationship between associates and support staff is similar to that of the 
employees in King Broadcasting Co., in that associates and support staff are merely 
doing sequential functions with the end goal of creating a single product. 
108. 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006). 
109. Id. at 688-94. 
110. Id. at 689. 
111. Id. 
25
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However, in clarifying the term “responsibly to direct,” the Board 
found that this term did include ad hoc instructions.
112
 Asserting that 
“responsibly to direct” is not limited to “department heads,” the Board 
stated, “If a person on the shop floor has ‘men under him,’ and if that 
person decides ‘what job shall be undertaken next or who shall do it,’ 
that person is a supervisor provided that the direction is both 
‘responsible’ . . . and carried out with independent judgment.”113 The 
Board went on to define “responsible,” holding: 
 
For direction to be “responsible,” the person directing 
and performing the oversight of the employee must be 
accountable for the performance of the task by the other, 
such that some adverse consequence may befall the one 
providing the oversight if the tasks performed by the 
employee are not performed properly. . . . 
Thus . . . it must be shown that the employer 
delegated to the putative supervisor the authority to 
direct the work and the authority to take corrective 
action, if necessary. It also must be shown that there is a 
prospect of adverse consequences for the putative 
supervisor if he/she does not take these steps.
114
 
 
In other words, for the term “responsibly to direct,” the Board, in 
order to distinguish between supervisors and non-supervisors, looks not 
only to the content of the directive (that is, overall duties versus ad hoc 
instructions), but also whether the order-giver can be held accountable 
for failure to perform the directive correctly.
115
 
Lastly, the Board’s decision in Oakwood affirmed that any 
supervisory act must be done with “independent judgment” and further 
defined the term.
116
 It stated, “to exercise ‘independent judgment’ an 
individual must at minimum act, or effectively recommend action, free of 
the control of others and form an opinion or evaluation by discerning and 
 
112. See id. at 691. 
113. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 714 (2001)). 
114. Id. at 691-92. 
115. Id. at 692 (“[T]he concept of accountability creates a clear distinction between 
those employees whose interest, in directing other employees’ tasks, align with 
management from those whose interests, in directing other employees, is simply the 
completion of a certain task.”). 
116. Id. at 695-98. 
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comparing data” and that “judgment is not independent if it is dictated or 
controlled by detailed instructions, whether set forth in company policies 
or rules, the verbal instructions of higher authority, or in the provisions 
of a collective bargaining agreement.”117 In this way, the Board affirmed 
the Supreme Court’s definition of “independent judgment” in Kentucky 
River.
118
 When applying this definition to the terms “assign” and 
“responsibly to direct,” the Board did note that “[i]t may happen that an 
individual’s assignment or responsible direction of another will be based 
on independent judgment within the dictionary definitions of those terms, 
but still not rise above the merely routine or clerical.”119 The Board failed 
to explain what this exactly means, leaving room for further clarification 
and development in this area of law. 
Since the Board’s decision in Oakwood, only the Second Circuit has 
had the opportunity to extensively apply Oakwood when deciding 
whether employees are supervisors under the NLRA. In NLRB v. Atlantic 
Paratrans of New York City, Inc., the court considered whether 
dispatchers were supervisors under the NLRA, and thus, not protected.
120
 
The court first considered whether the dispatchers exercised 
“independent judgment” when assigning drivers to their routes.121 The 
court observed that many routes were pre-assigned, and to the extent that 
some routes had to be reassigned, the dispatchers considered factors that 
were “largely mechanical and geographical; and [did] not rest on 
considerations of the skill of the drivers.
122
 Consequently, the Second 
Circuit found “that evaluating and comparing data is not always 
sufficient [to achieve supervisory status] because it may be routine and 
clerical in nature,” thus affirming Oakwood’s requirement that judgment 
must be free from outside control or instructions in order to be 
independent.
123
 
The court then looked at whether the dispatchers could be found to 
“responsibly to direct” others such that they would face “some adverse 
consequence . . . if the tasks performed . . . are not performed 
properly.”124 The court found that there were no instances of dispatchers 
 
117. Id. at 692-93. 
118. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
119. Oakwood Healthcare Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 693. 
120. 300 F. App’x 54, 55 (2d Cir. 2008). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 56. 
123. Id. (citing Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 693). 
124. Id. at 57 (quoting Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 691). 
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being warned that they would be disciplined or actually being punished 
for drivers’ misconduct or their failure to perform their jobs properly.125 
Additionally, the court noted that dispatchers had no authority to 
discipline or recommend discipline for drivers, despite “uncontested” 
evidence that they write up incidents, testify at disciplinary hearings, and 
are present when supervisors provide warnings to drivers.
126
 As a result, 
the court ruled that the dispatchers simply “give . . . information” rather 
than “effective recommendations,” “which is not sufficient for 
supervisory authority.”127 
Indeed, the Second Circuit’s application of Oakwood in Atlantic 
demonstrates that employees who manage others in accordance with set 
procedures and who play a limited role in the discipline of those they 
allegedly supervise will not be found sufficiently supervisory so that they 
are excluded from protection. While the supervisory exclusion poses the 
most significant obstacle to private attorney organizing, the above 
analysis suggests that the law governing supervisors continues to 
develop. The greatest concern regarding the attempts to clarify the 
supervisory exclusion is that the exclusion may eventually swallow the 
NLRA’s application to professional employees.128 
Ultimately, some attorneys will be found to be supervisors, but 
many will not. Like determining which employees are confidential, the 
inquiry into whether an associate is a supervisor will be fact-specific, and 
any attorneys interested in organizing will want to examine their 
situation in accordance with the developing law.
129
 
 
C.  The Managerial Employee Exclusion 
 
The final exclusion that an employer may use in order to prevent 
attorneys from organizing is the managerial exclusion, which was 
developed by the NLRB and the Supreme Court through case law.
130
 
 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 700 (dissenting opinion) (the 
dissenting members of the NRLB voiced concern that the “decision threaten[ed] to create 
a new class of workers under Federal labor law: workers who have neither the genuine 
prerogatives of management, nor the statutory rights of ordinary employees.”). 
129. See Rubinstein, supra note 77, at 26. 
130. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (“The Wagner 
Act . . . did not expressly mention the term ‘managerial employee.’ After the Act’s 
passage, however, the Board developed the concept of ‘managerial’ employee in a series 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2
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However, the rationale for this exclusion rests primarily on Congress’s 
intent “to exclude from the protections of the Act all employees properly 
classified as ‘managerial.’”131 Thus, the exclusion acts “[t]o ensure that 
employees who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the 
employer will not divide their loyalty between employer and union.”132 
In Bell Aerospace Co., the Supreme Court defined managerial 
employees as “executives who formulate and effectuate management 
policies by expressing and making operative decisions of their 
employer.”133 Here, the test of whether an employee is managerial is 
whether “he represents management interests by taking or recommending 
discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer 
policy.”134 In other words, managerial employees are employees who are 
aligned with management and have the discretion to act either within or 
independently of established employer policy.
135
 In order for an 
employee “to be aligned with management, the employee’s duties must 
be ‘outside the scope of duties routinely performed by a similarly 
situated professional.’”136 As such, “routine discharge of professional 
duties” does not confer managerial status upon an employee because 
these duties do not fall “outside the scope of the duties routinely 
performed by similarly situated professionals.”137 
Like the other exclusions, making such a determination will be fact-
intensive. However, most associates will likely not fall into this 
exclusion mainly because they have no effect on the management of the 
law firms that employ them.
138
 As such, they generally cannot be 
 
of cases involving the appropriateness of bargaining units.”). 
131. Id. at 275. See also NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980) (“The 
Act was intended to accommodate the type of management-employee relations that 
prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry.”). 
132. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 687-88. 
133. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 286. 
134. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 683 (citing Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 274, 286-89; 
Sutter Cmty. Hosps., 227 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976); Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 
385-86 (1975); Gen. Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857-58 (1974)). 
135.  See id. 
136. Id. at 690. See also Nurses United for Improved Patient Healthcare, 338 
N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (2003). 
137. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690. 
138. See id. at 690 n.30 (“For this reason, architects and engineers functioning as 
project captains for work performed by teams of professionals are deemed employees 
despite substantial planning responsibility and authority to direct and evaluate team 
members.”). This reasoning should apply no differently to private attorneys employed at 
law firms. 
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excluded from organizing based on the managerial exclusion. 
 
D.  Attorney Professional Responsibilities 
 
Lastly, employers may attempt to prevent attorneys from unionizing 
by asserting that such organization violates the professional 
responsibilities of attorneys. This Part will discuss these concerns and 
address any ethical considerations that may hinder a private attorney’s 
ability to organize. 
In 1967, prior to the adoption of the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility (the “Model Code”), the American Bar Association 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the “Committee”) 
determined that salaried employee-attorneys may join a union that is 
limited to other lawyers who are employed by the same employer for the 
purpose of negotiating wages, hours, and working conditions.
139
 The 
Committee, however, found that “such a lawyer would not have the right 
to strike, to withhold services for any reasons, to divulge confidences or 
engage in any other activities . . . which would violate any Canon [of 
Ethics].”140 The Committee also stated that lawyers interested in 
unionizing should not join any union with non-attorneys.
141
 
After the Model Code was adopted, the Committee once again 
addressed the ethical concern of attorneys forming or joining unions. In 
Informal Opinion 1325, the Committee wrote that “[t]he Code of 
Professional Responsibility contain[ed] no Disciplinary Rule that 
specifically prohibits membership by lawyers in unions or associations 
representing lawyers,” noting specifically that “lawyers are not forbidden 
per se to belong to unions, whether or not the union membership is 
limited to lawyers.”142 The Committee then pointed to provision EC 5-13 
in the Code of Professional Responsibility as providing “ethical 
guidance.”143 EC 5-13 states: 
 
A lawyer should not maintain membership in or be 
influenced by any organization of employees that 
 
139. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 986 (1967). 
140. Id. (stating also that “strikes, picketing, boycotts and any type of withholding 
of services (including the non-passage of picket lines) should be expressly prohibited.”). 
141. Id. 
142. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325 (1975). 
143. Id. 
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undertakes to prescribe, direct, or suggest when or how 
he should fulfill his professional obligations to a person 
or organization that employs him as a lawyer. Although 
it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a 
corporation or similar entity to be a member of an 
organization of employees, he should be vigilant to 
safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employer, free 
from outside influences.
144
 
 
The Committee acknowledged that while EC 5-13 “mentions no 
Disciplinary Rule specifically,” the primary concern is that a unionized 
lawyer may “be confronted with a choice between acquiescing or 
assisting in certain union activities and violating certain Disciplinary 
Rules” such as neglecting a legal matter, intentionally failing to carry out 
an employment contract with a client, or intentionally prejudicing or 
damaging one’s client.145 The Committee went on to note that, in some 
instances, participating in union activities may cause an attorney to 
neglect her duties, but this is not necessarily the case in every 
circumstance.
146
 In fact, it specifically observed, “participation in a strike 
might be no more disruptive of the performance of legal work than 
taking a two week’s vacation might be.”147 Ultimately, the Committee 
found that it would be “idle speculation” to determine which other 
Disciplinary Rules may be violated if a lawyer participated in union 
activities.
148
 The Committee simply stated: 
 
Lawyers who are union members are required, the same 
as all other lawyers, to comply with all Disciplinary 
Rules at all times; and lawyers who are union members 
should not permit the organization to prescribe, direct or 
suggest how to fulfill one’s professional obligations, but 
should be vigilant at all times to safeguard one’s fidelity 
to employer free from outside influences.
149
 
 
 
144. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-13 (1983). 
145. Informal Op. 1325, supra note 142. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
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Consequently, the Board has routinely dismissed arguments that the 
professional responsibilities of lawyers prevent them from unionizing.
150
 
 
V.  Imagining a Private Attorney Union 
 
Given the absence of a complete bar to private attorney 
unionization, this Part endeavors to lay out, generally, how a private 
attorneys’ union may be formed and address the practical concerns such 
unions may encounter. This Part is by no means thorough, and should be 
considered a starting point rather than a how-to guide. 
 
A.  General Procedure for Establishing Representation 
 
Like any other employees that wish to form a union for the purpose 
of collective bargaining, attorneys will have to follow the typical 
statutory procedure.
151
 Generally, attorneys interested in unionizing will 
have to submit to the Board an election petition and a “showing of 
interest,” which must come from 30 percent of the employees in the 
bargaining unit.
152
 This is normally achieved by signed authorization 
cards.
153
 Afterwards, a regional field examiner or attorney will 
investigate the petition.
154
 A hearing will then be conducted in order to 
create a full record as to jurisdiction, appropriate unit, representation, and 
timeliness, and the hearing officer will then forward a report 
summarizing and analyzing the issues to the regional director.
155
 The 
regional director will then make a decision as to the disputed matters, 
and either order elections or dismiss the petition.
156
 
 
 
150. See, e.g., Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977). 
151. The Author assumes that employers of private attorneys will not voluntarily 
acknowledge the existence of a bargaining unit and recognize a union as the 
representative for employees in that unit. This seems to be a fair assumption given that 
almost all employers challenge their employees unionizing efforts. As such, the 
procedure laid out in this section will assume no voluntary recognition. 
152. ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: 
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 55 (2d ed. 2004). See also National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (West 2011); Investigations of Petition Rule, 29 C.F.R. 
101.18(a) (2011). 
153. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 152, at 55. 
154. Id. at 56. 
155. Id.  
156. Id. at 57. 
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B.  The Bargaining Unit 
 
Given the procedure explained above, determining the bargaining 
unit will be crucial to ensuring the success of attorneys who want to 
unionize. Generally, the Board looks for “an employee group which is 
united by community of interest.”157 In other words, the bargaining unit 
should “neither embrace[] employees [who have] a substantial conflict of 
economic interest nor omit[] employees sharing a unity of economic 
interest with other employees in the bargaining . . . constituency.”158 
Because of this “community of interest” standard, attorneys will 
want to think carefully about those they wish to include in their union. 
First, because each law firm has a different internal employee structure, 
with some variation across offices, private attorneys will probably want 
to organize by law firm, and in some instances, by office. Second, 
attorneys should probably avoid joining existing unions created by 
support staff and paralegals. Instead, they should create their own 
attorney-only union.
159
 This will ensure that the “community of interest” 
standard is met and help avoid any ethical issues. Lastly, organizing 
attorneys will want to be cognizant of the statutory and judicially created 
exceptions to the definition of employee in the NLRA. For example, 
while many new associates and junior associates may not fall into the 
supervisory exclusion, mid-level and senior associates may well be 
excluded from organizing and bargaining because of their increased 
 
157. Id. at 87. The Board may also consider the following factors: 
 
(1) [S]imilarity in the scale and manner of determining earnings; (2) 
similarity in employment benefits, hours of work and other terms and 
conditions of employment; (3) similarity in the kind of work 
performed; (4) similarity in the qualifications, skills and training of 
the employees; (5) frequency of contact or interchange among the 
employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or integration of 
production processes; (8) common supervision and determination of 
labor-relations policy; (9) relationship to the administrative 
organization of the employer; (10) history of collective bargaining; 
(11) desires of the affected employees; (12) extent of union 
organization. 
 
Id. at 87-88. 
158. Id. at 87. 
159. See, e.g., Wayne Cnty. Neighborhood Legal Servs. Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1023, 
1024 (1977) (finding all attorneys constituted an appropriate bargaining unit, excluding 
paralegals, secretaries, law students, and investigators). 
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responsibilities.
160
 
 
C.  Scope of Collective Bargaining 
 
The original version of the NLRA did not specifically define the 
scope of collective bargaining. However, with the addition of the Taft-
Hartley Amendments, the Act now requires that employers and 
representatives of the employees meet and confer “in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.”161 In addition, there may be “areas of special concern to 
white collar workers.”162 These areas may include “better vacations and 
sick leave plans” and “more interest in insurance and stock-sharing 
programs.”163 Indeed, blue-collar worker unions have normally bargained 
for issues such as better vacation and sick leave.
164
 Ultimately, there is no 
reason to think that there will be significant differences between the 
agreements negotiated by white-collar groups and those negotiated by 
blue-collar groups.
165
 
 
D.  Concerted Activities 
 
For many, the right to strike is fundamental to those that unionize. 
In fact, the right to organize may have little significance absent the 
ability to strike.
166
 As explained previously, engaging in a strike may 
pose particular ethical considerations for unionizing attorneys.
167
 In 
addition, striking may be particularly difficult in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association.168 
There, the Court held that a strike by court-appointed attorneys violated 
federal antitrust laws.
169
 Specifically, it found that the attorneys’ efforts 
to obtain higher wages through “concerted refusal” was the “essence of 
 
160. See id. (finding also that supervisory attorneys should be excluded from the 
bargaining unit). 
161. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (West 2011). 
162. Kassalow, supra note 35, at 362. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 322. 
167. See infra Part III.D. 
168. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
169. Id. at 422. 
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‘price-fixing,’” thus violating section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.
170
 Whether this case will reach beyond court-appointed attorneys 
remains unclear. 
Assuming, however, that an attorney strike may raise antitrust 
concerns, there may be other ways for attorneys to engage in concerted 
activities or, at the very least, modify their strike practices. For example, 
attorneys could provide advanced notice of their intent to strike, similar 
to the statutory requirement for organized healthcare professionals.
171
 
Additionally, a private attorney union could voluntarily adopt a no-strike 
policy and embrace some form of arbitration to ensure that a resolution is 
reached when there is an impasse in bargaining.
172
 For instance, some 
professional unions, including nurses and engineers, have adopted strong 
positions against strikes, and interest arbitration has been used for police 
officers and firefighters as an alternative to striking.
173
 Interest 
arbitration, specifically, allows employers and employees to resort to an 
independent mediator, who, based on a fact-finding examination, issues a 
report resolving any disputes that cannot be settled during bargaining.
174
 
In fact, interest arbitration has been included in the Employee Free 
Choice Act (EFCA), a proposed bill that would amend the NLRA in 
order to streamline the union certification process.
175
 In the end, there 
remain viable strategies to allow attorneys to engage in concerted 
activities, despite the concerns surrounding the ability of private 
attorneys to strike. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Current conditions may be ripe for private attorney unionizing. The 
 
170. Id. at 423 (quoting Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 
234 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). For a greater discussion of this case, see Midwood & Vitacco, 
supra note 20, at 322-25. 
171. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A § 158(g) (West 2011). 
172. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 363; Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 
329-30. 
173. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 363; Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 
329 (citing N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(2) (McKinney 1999)). 
174. See Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 329-30 (citing N.Y. CIV. SERV. 
LAW § 209(2) (McKinney 1999)). See also Mandatory First Contract Interest 
Arbitration, JACKSON LEWIS LLP (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalup 
dates/article.cfm?aid=1511. 
175. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); Employee 
Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). See also JACKSON LEWIS 
LLP , supra note 174. 
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threat of a double-dip recession coupled with the legal industry’s massive 
layoffs, compensation restructuring, and overall slow recovery has left 
private attorneys just as vulnerable as their blue-collar brethren.
176
 It is 
this type of job uncertainty that makes the prospect of organizing 
appealing.
177
 
In fact, there have been both legislative and regulatory efforts to 
amend the NLRA to appeal to today’s workers. For example, the EFCA, 
a bill that was introduced in the 111
th
 Congress, would have made 
organizing especially attractive to white-collar workers because it would 
streamline the lengthy election process.
178
 President Barack Obama 
publicly stated his support for the bill.
179
 Although the bill never came to 
a vote, this legislation is expected to be reintroduced in the current 112
th
 
Congress.
180
 Most recently, on June 21, 2011, the NLRB proposed 
regulatory reforms similar to those contained in the EFCA that would 
likewise streamline pre- and post-election procedures.
181
 
Just as the NLRA provided answers at the time of the Great 
 
176. See James B. Kelleher, White-Collar Blues Play Well with U.S. Labor Unions, 
REUTERS, Jan. 29, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE50R6MU2 
0090128. In fact, there has already been speculation on how the current market slides will 
affect the legal industry. See also David Lat, Are We Entering a Double-Dip Recession? 
If So, What Should We Do?, ABOVE LAW (Aug. 9, 2011, 10:19 AM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/08/are-we-entering-a-double-dip-recession-if-so-how-canla 
w-firms-respond/. 
177. Kelleher, supra note 176. Kelleher offers a quote from Harley Sheiken, a 
professor at the University of California, Berkeley, on the issue: 
 
There's something new in the air. . . . There is a sense that white-
collar workers have become the blue-collar workers of the 21st 
century in terms of job security, wages and benefits. That's certainly 
how they're treated. And if you're treated like a blue-collar worker, 
you may respond like a blue-collar worker and seek to protect 
benefits and maintain some job security. 
 
Id. 
178. See S. 560 § 2; H.R. 1409 § 2; Kelleher, supra note 176 (explaining that “[i]f 
the more low-key, petition-like approach allowed under the proposed EFCA passes, [it] 
would be much more suited for (white-collar) tastes.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21887, THE EMPLOYEE FREE 
CHOICE ACT 1-3 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace 
/783. 
179. Kelleher, supra note 176. 
180. SHIMABUKURO, supra note 178, at 7. 
181. Proposed Amendments to NLRB Election Rules and Regulations Fact Sheet, 
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/node/525 (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
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Depression, it may now hold answers for those who have found the legal 
industry’s response to the Great Recession unsatisfying. As law firms 
continue to adjust to a new economic reality, associates should be asking 
themselves whether they are willing to risk living through another 2009 
with all its uncertainties and unpredictability. Indeed, associates may 
want to consider the words Senator Robert Wagner spoke when 
introducing the NLRA to the Senate: 
 
The time has come to ask: Where are we 
progressing? Are we content to return to the uneven 
prosperity of the nineteen twenties, with its poverty, its 
uncertainty, and its seeds of recurrent depressions? Or 
are we prepared to lay the solid foundations for a saner 
and happier mode of economic life?
182
 
 
Today, the questions remain, but now the answers depend on associates. 
 
182. 78 Cong. Rec. 3,678 (1934), supra note 1, at 18 (statement by Sen. Wagner). 
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